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Elzenberg’s philosophy is usually defined as perfectionism, culturalism, pessimism, 
conservatism, or asceticism. Despite the accuracy and validity of the above mentioned terms it 
seems, however, that none of them fully encompass the characteristics of the view, tending 
rather to focus on its given profile. One term that, in my opinion, can be regarded as a suitable 
candidate for the role is “aristocratism of the spirit”, which embraces perfectionism, 
culturalism and asceticism as well as pessimism, conservatism and outsiderism. In debating 
on the elzenbergian variety of this idea I would like to put forward his relation to, or 
entanglement with the tendency to think in the categories of the aristocratism of the spirit, that 
has been present since the dawn of philosophy. I use the tentative term ‘entanglement’ here, 
as Elzenberg in his writings never declared, either openly or indirectly, any (formal) 
adherence to a movement, including the movement of the aristocratism of the spirit. My 
ascribing Elzenberg to this movement is a convention of interpretation, imposed upon his 
philosophy for heuristic reasons. 
Keywords: aristocratism of the spirit, perfectionism, culturalism, individualism, 
asceticism, contemplation, spiritual community, monoseology (philosophy of loneliness), 





Whoever believes in moral progress today?... - Ambition, 
the desire to aggrandise oneself... - how they always 
manage to nest at the very centre of the most glorious 
ethical pursuit! 
- Without the battle for ethical standards life would be 
lifelessness, reduced to pure mechanics of desires and 
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The virtue of a thinker is his exactness; the virtue of an 
artist - his expressivity. But, strangely, there is a third virtue 





The enemy of the spirit are not the senses and the body; the 






ELZENBERGISM AS ARISTOCRATISM 
  
To define the philosophical views of Henryk Elzenberg in their entirety, taking into account 
their scope and diversity, especially with reference to the body of ethical beliefs
5
, as 
aristocratism of the spirit is nothing new, insightful or particularly surprising. It is, however, 
uncommon to regard them as such, particularly in the light of the approach that I propose. 









, or asceticism. Despite the accuracy and validity of the above mentioned terms 
it seems, however, that none of them fully encompass the characteristics of the view, tending 
rather to focus on its given profile. One term that, in my opinion, can be regarded as a suitable 
candidate for the role is "aristocratism of the spirit", which embraces perfectionism, 
culturalism and asceticism as well as pessimism, conservatism and outsiderism. This is 
evidenced by the long history of the philosophical movement, which I venture to call the 
movement (or, more tentatively, a tendency) of the aristocratism of the spirit. If to identify 
elzenbergism as aristocratism is, admittedly, not a novelty in itself, the perspective that I 
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propose incorporating the philosophy into a multi-century, broad (as it touches upon diverse 
schools of thought, directions and approaches) but, at the same time, unified and concise 
philosophical movement advocating the idea of the aristocratism of the spirit, can be regarded 
as such. In debating on the elzenbergian variety of this idea I would like to put forward his 
relation to, or entanglement with the tendency to think in the categories of the aristocratism of 
the spirit, that has been present since the dawn of philosophy. I use the tentative term 
'entanglement' here, as Elzenberg in his writings never declared, either openly or indirectly, 
any (formal) adherence to a movement
10
, including the movement of the aristocratism of the 
spirit. My ascribing Elzenberg to this movement is a convention of interpretation, imposed 
upon his philosophy for heuristic reasons. Elzenberg himself not only did not declare any 
institutional association of his philosophy
11
, admitting, nevertheless, his many inspirations, 
sympathies, relations, lesser and greater influences
12
, but also did nothing to give it an official 
label
13
. Notwithstanding, it would be difficult for this Polish philosopher of European scale
14
 
ever to admit to having any relation to the elite circle of theoreticians of the idea of the 
aristocratism of the spirit - for such a circle formally never existed. It is thus difficult to refer 
to an entity that is non-existent, to which I assign the status of a research hypothesis useful for 
exploring, describing and explaining the source, development, continuity and character of the 
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his philosophical antipathies, which he did not hesitate to express, most notably neo-positivism and the Lwow-
Warsaw School of Logic, as well as Tadeusza Kotarbiński's practical realism. See also: W. Tyburski , 
Elzenberg. Podręcznik akademicki [Elzenberg. An academic handbook.], op.cit., p. 27. For reference on the 
latter subject see H. Elzenberg, Realizm praktyczny w etyce naczelne wartości życia ludzkiego [Practical 
realism in ethics, principal values in human life], in a work by the same author Wartość i człowiek. Rozprawy  
z humanistyki i filozofii [Value and man. Deliberations in philosophy and humanities.] UMK Press, Toruń 2005, 
p. 200–210; originally printed in „Ruch Filozoficzny” 1963. 
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  Elzenberg did sometimes refer to his approach using a distinct name. In a short fragment from his 
work, the author states: I have spoken of my "culturalism" frequently before... (emphasis P.D.) See H. 
Elzenberg, Kłopot z istnieniem. Aforyzmy w porządku czasu  [The trouble with being. Aphorisms in the 
structure of time.], op.cit., p 484. 
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conceptual tendency that constitutes the movement I refer to as the aristocratism of the spirit. 
This tendency was common for thinkers from a variety of epochs and streams, for whom it 
was not uncommon to be unaware of, or hide, mutual influences and continuations. The task I 
am undertaking here is far from hopeless, and my postulate to define Elzenberg's thought as 
aristocratism of the spirit and incorporate it  into the mainstream philosophy, despite lack of 
an explicit declaration from the author of Torun philosophy regarding such a connection, 
seems to be justified also with reference to Elzenberg's writing. What I have in mind here is 
particularly the fragment of The trouble with being cited as the motto in the beginning, which 
speaks volumes about the author's nostalgia for perfectionist ethics, constructed on the 
foundations and fuelled by the thought on moral progress, ambition and the desire to 
aggrandise oneself15, to soar above the planes, as the great Polish poet wrote once. That same 
fragment of The trouble also illustrates the high regard that Elzenberg had for ethics based on 
the aristocratism of the spirit, which he saw as the basis for the most glorious ethical 
pursuit16.  The fact that the philosopher uses the adverb 'always' leads me to conclude that he 
was convinced about the long pedigree, historical continuity and the separateness of the 
ideological reflection on the idea of the aristocratism of the spirit, even though he was not a 
member of the movement. There are places in Elzenberg's works where he seems to admit to 
a communal feeling with those, who have accepted and lived the idea of the aristocratism of 
the spirit and who formed a type of spiritual community17. This can be illustrated by the 
following fragment of The trouble with being: 
 
A deeper, more interesting, singularly justified and it may well be that the most important in my thought 
is the following motif. A man who writes on subtler matters usually feels a sense of loneliness; he 
senses in his reader not only indifference, but hostility; this has a depressing effect. To reminiscence 
about people valued and famous who dealt in similar matters makes the writer feel less lonesome and, 
faced with the hostility on the part of the reader, somehow supported. He feels that he is a part of a 
certain spiritual community, rather than a pariah and a cursed outcast. At the same time he reminds 
the reader of the community's existence and, thus, if the reader is ordinary he is intimidated and 
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ELZENBERG AS AN ARISTOCRAT 
 
It is worth noting here, on a personal note, that Elzenberg was not only an experienced 
theoretician of the idea of the aristocratism of the spirit, but also a practitioner and executioner 
of the thought, consequent and indefatigable, despite the challenges he faced. It could be said 
without exaggeration that Elzenberg had the soul of an aristocrat. He was a scholar, a man of 
uncommon appearance and manners. He was reliable in his scholarly work. He was singularly 
demanding towards other people as well as himself. His inborn witty criticism made him 
unable to ignore many issues, or to accept easy solutions. He always had his own opinion, 
which he stated openly in text, with little regard for the controversy he caused or the 
consequences it had for him. Always faithful to himself and his beliefs, the ironical and heroic 
advocate of wisdom and virtue; a sworn enemy and slayer of human ignorance, mediocrity 
and lack of principle. He was known for his polemics, the master of witty repartees, he 
became famous for his theory that philosophy is a permanent state of war; 
 
…the fight for world-view, and so for life. Who refuses to defend themselves in this fight by attacking, 




And so, Elzenberg, never stopped fighting the views he opposed. He was famous as the 
uncompromising enemy of the curse of impotent rationalism20,the arrogant dumbness of 
logicism
21
, scientism, which he openly hated
22
. He regularly contested the Lwow-Warsaw 
school of logic paradigm
23
, whose representatives he disdainfully called the 
Twardowszczyk's24, and also bureaucrats of exactness25. He was a fierce opponent of Sartre, 
whose interpretation of freedom he saw as grotesque26, and whose philosophy he thought 
little of. While demonstrating his disdain towards Sartre, Elzenberg never tried to hide his 
reverence for Jaspers
27
, whom he, however, also criticised
28
. Elzenberg's judgments were 
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equally fierce towards Tadeusz Kotarbiński, as he accused him and his followers of the crime 
of closing paths before man29. In general, for Elzenberg Kotarbiński was a constant target30. 
The aristocratic mind of this one of the greatest Polish philosophers of the twentieth century, 
which in itself is a confirmation of the greatness of this mind, was led by its high aspirations 
and disdain towards anything that is shallow, bland and mediocre
31 
to battle against the  
ignorance of  the lumpenproletariat and the arrogance of the aristocracy of louts32, who 
usurped the right to wisdom and virtue. Thus, while Elzenberg cleared the way for the 
ascension of the beautiful aristocratic idea33, for this very reason he fell into disgrace and 
rejection of those whom he rejected and despised. As a result Elzenberg joined the host of 
intellectuals, philosophers, writers, and artists who, like him, defended the same aristocratic 
idea and tried to introduce it into society. And thus finally Elzenberg, partially because he 
provoked it, partially because he wished for it and partially because he saw no other choice 
chose to spend the rest of his life in seclusion
34
, accepting the role of Colin Wilson's 
outsider
35
. In support of my view I will quote The trouble with being: 
 
I share a common world with no spirit; I share with no spirit what brightens my path, my reason for 
thought and life. And to search for such spirits is futile: no community can be founded on the charms of 
life, on the interplay of fragile, ambiguous symbols. No kindred consciousness can reflect that which I 
love like mine, or have new life to replace the one it will lose with me. Not only I am lonely, but my 
world is lonely among the immeasurable number of worlds separated by the insurmountable abyss of 
individual difference. This is my great melancholia, an ocean of sadness over the ocean of beauty, that 
makes it impossible to die mirthfully. How should one die then? - with love, love for - let me 
reminiscence upon the well-known words of a poet
36
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THE IDEA OF ARISTOCRATISM OF THE SPIRIT 
IN ELZENBERG’S THOUGHT 
  
It is known that the noble idea of the aristocratism of the spirit comes from the Pythagorean 
tradition. The source of the idea, however, is to be sought in the Orphic Mysteries, from 
which it was transferred to philosophy. The idea of aristocratism stems from the ultimately 
trivial realisation that a human mass generates pettiness, mediocrity, inferiority, anonymity 
and automatism and is swamped in the mixture, whereas individuals break free from the 
shackles of the omnipresent prosaism and, facing ostracism from the mob, they create and 
design standards that can be reached only by the best and are far from the reach of the mob. 
 The dissociation that can be empirically observed between the thoughtless, indolent 
human mass - the mob - and the idealist, creative, ambitious individuals - the chosen ones 
who, in the Pythagorean tradition dating back to the Orphic-Pythagorean thought, in a 
symbolic sense are frozen in the opposition between the life of a mob and the life of a sage. In 
this tradition the mob embodies the worst vices, whereas the sage - the unattainable ideal - 
embodies the greatest virtues. This is reflected in the axiology of the two types of life, one of 
which (the life of a mob) was always judged pejoratively, as worthless aberration; the other 
(the life of a sage) was judged as the highest value, the highest form of human perfection; 
sometimes even a value in itself. Despite the fact that the life of a mob and the life of a sage 
are separated by an insurmountable abyss, they are entangled as one affects the other. The 
dialectic of the life of a mob and the life of a sage is a battle between the forces of apathy, 
denial, destruction and degeneration and the forces of activity, creation, persuasion and 
perfectionism. The sage abhors the mob, and yet feels driven to force it out of its apathetic 
state and direct towards perfection. These remedying actions of the sage, his lofty ideals, his 
drive to universalise superiority and sublimity
38
,the constant pressure of self improvement - 
all this meets with, often violent, resistance from the mob, that may stem from 
incommodation (maladjustment), misunderstanding or indifference. The mob would use all 
means available to stigmatise any sign of superiority, sublimity and genius. Most often used, 
and at the same time the most severe of those means are stigmatisation, isolation and 
alienation. The final outcome is most often that the philosopher is alienated and marked as an 
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outsider. The sage finds himself thus in a paradoxical situation. He who has the right to 
stigmatise is himself stigmatised, and by those who ought to be stigmatised themselves, as 
stigma, understood in its classical definition that dates back to antiquity, is a sign of shame, 
moral defects, disorders or lack of moral competence. To be stigmatised is severely 
degrading, putting oneself at a risk of moral discrimination.  Stigmatisation means, 
 
…that the moral status ... of the bearer [of the stigma - P.D.] is associated with something extraordinary 
and evil
39
. (emphasis P.D.) 
 
It is astonishing that in the mutual relationship between the sage and the mob the proportion 
between normality and deviation are disrupted and reversed. The mob takes over the role of 
the normals40 from the sage, the sage becomes the bearer of the stigma. If stigma is 
understood as moral infamy, the result of this reversal in roles is that the sage, who represents 
and whose goal is the moral progress
41
 of himself and others is judged as apostate by those 
who are themselves morally indifferent, degraded or degenerated. 
 As a consequence of his stigmatisation, the sage is eliminated from society
42 
that does 
not accept him, and that he, against his ideals and himself, is not able to accept. There is, 
again, the dialectical battle between the sides. The society is ready to admit the sage if he 
agrees to lower his standards and adjust to fit the level of society. The sage, in contrast, is 
ready to integrate into the society if it agrees to raise itself to his level according to his 
directions.  
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  E. Goff man , Piętno. Rozważania o zranionej tożsamości [Stigma. Deliberations on hurt identity], 
transl. A. Dzierżyński, J. Tokarska-Bakir, GWP, Gdańsk 2005, p. 31. 
40
  Normals is a neologism, coined by Erving Goffman and denoting a person who fits into an acceptable 
framework, which is established, regulated and enforced by the society (the so called majority); the person is 
under constant threat of being exposed as not belonging to the normals' and stigmatized. Goffman opposed the 
use of the word 'normal' knowing what 'normal people' are capable of. He claimed that the term 'normality' is 
used to hide perversions, deviations and disorders and paradoxically leads to their stereotypization and 
demonization. For further reference on this topic see J. Tokarska-Bakir, Wstęp do wydania polskiego. 
Et(n)ologia piętna [Introduction to the Polish edition. Et(n)ology of beauty] in E. Goffman , Piętno. 
Rozważania o zranionej tożsamości [Stigma. Deliberations on hurt identity], op.cit., p. 20–21. Reference to 
Goffman is perhaps awkward here, as he would not have seen the change of roles between the sage and the mob 
as "surprising". For him the canonical 'normality' as something ascribed to the sage never existed. What is more, 
the author proposes that a superior person the sage does not undergo stigmatisation cf. J. Tokarska-Bakir, Wstęp 
do wydania polskiego. Et(n)ologia piętna [Introduction to the Polish edition. Et(n)ology of beauty] in E. 
Goff man , Piętno. Rozważania o zranionej tożsamości [Stigma. Deliberations on hurt identity], op.cit., p. 21. 
41
  As used by Elzenberg and quoted in the first formula of the motto of the present work. See Kłopot  
z istnieniem. Aforyzmy w porządku czasu [The trouble with being. Aphorisms in the structure of time.], op.cit., p. 
187. 
42
  For the purpose of the present work I treat the terms 'human mass', 'the mob', the common', 




 The sage is faced with an internal struggle. On the one hand, he is drawn to society so 
as to push it towards moral progress; on the other, he is visibly reluctant to do so, afraid to 
betray his ideals, foreseeing the failure of his mission and even feeling disgust to descend to 
the level of the common. What then is left for the sage to do? Seclusion and the search for his 
like. But even in a community of the distinguished and superior one cannot settle for the 
competition in moral progress. It is evidently a long, tedious and complicated process, full of 
difficulties, failure and dejection. One cannot forget that moral perfection, the greatest  
priority of the sage and the goal of his actions, is also the most difficult goal to achieve for 
man in general; in fact, it is an unattainable ideal. The sage, however, is not built to be 
discouraged by the obstacles to his development and, as Elzenberg points out, is content with 
his pursuit of perfection and aware that nevertheless he can never reach it. Indispensable here 
is a quote from The trouble, in which the author cogently expresses this idea in just a few 
words: 
 
To chose a goal higher than one hopes to attain is sensible only for someone for whom the goal is not the 
greatest good, but for whom the pursuit
43 




Homo ethicus… is a man whose own morality is his particular concern and who pursues it consciously, 
precisely because he does not feel completely at ease. He is a stoic prokopton, with focus, however, not 




Regardless of the circumstances, the fate of the sage is inevitably solitude, which can 
take a variety of shapes and sizes. The components of the solitude that the sage is facing are 
usually: seclusion, lack of understanding from his surroundings, low self-esteem, indifference, 
derision, disdain, rejection, marginalization or elimination (exclusion from the local 
community), internal emigration, oversensitive focusing on oneself, a sense of loneliness and  
enmity of the world – or lack of kindred spirits. At the same time, solitude is the sage’s 
weapon in the battle for virtue. Conscious that only solitude, used for soliloquies, can help 
him deepen his understanding of himself; comprehend the notion of humanity, what it means 
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  H. Elzenberg, Kłopot z istnieniem. Aforyzmy w porządku czasu [The trouble with being. Aphorisms 
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to belong to the human race and empathize with it; discover the universal human character of 
the moral imperatives and values that he discovered ‘in himself’; find a direct and personal 
relation to God and to nature as the universal order45; drawing a multitude of spiritual 
benefits from his solitude the sage makes it his lifestyle and the foundation of his existence. 
Even though for the sage his solitude is at times a heavy burden, as is his role of an outsider, 
he is aware that, for him, there is no alternative; that in fact he is held hostage by his 
outsiderism.  
The figure of the sage – the aristocrat of the spirit  (gr. aristoi)46- evokes to the notions 
of individualism, contemplation and asceticism, therefore the movement of aristocratic 
thought ought to be classified as a contemplative variation of the grand individualist narrative, 
in the framework of the philosophy of solitude. Consequently Elzenberg himself, as a 
representative of aristocratic thought, simultaneously belongs to the broad movement of 
contemplative individualism. He can thus be classified as the philosopher of solitude
47
. It is 
no accident that Elzenberg is placed in the framework of solitude philosophy. In many of his 
works the monoseological48 perspective occupies a privileged position in the context of 
perfectionist ethics analyses. I quote here a fragment of his work which, I hope, will convince 
the reader of the credibility of my speculation. 
  
One cannot achieve personal improvement without becoming detached to a certain extent. And one 
cannot attain a level that is even slightly higher, without it driving more people away than are ready to 
accept us. 
- Whoever is devoted to shaping oneself, will be alone; this is a constant rule. For he is devoted to 
something that nobody holds in regard, and in normal conditions he can expect no help with it: for only in 
                                                   
45
 This is a modification of the thought by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, as presented by Bronis ław Baczko in his 
book Rousseau: samotność i wspólnota [Rousseau: solitude and community], PWN, Warsaw 1964, p. 286. Cf. 
J.J. Rousseau , Listy moralne. List szósty [Morality letters. Letter Six.], in: J.J. Rousseau , Umowa społeczna, 
[The social contract] transl. M. Pawłowska, PWN, Warsaw 1966, p. 587. 
46
 For further reference on this topic see J. Le gowicz, Historia filozofii starożytnej Grecji i Rzymu [The history 
of antique philosophy in Greece and Rome] PWN, Warsaw 1973,  
p. 32–34, 39–40. 
47
 The only work I am familiar with that gives a detailed, reliable and inspiring account of Elzenberg’s 
philosophy as voiced in The trouble with being is written by Tadeusz Kobierzycki.  
See T. Kobierzycki , Filozoficzne problemy samotności (H. Elzenberg, Kłopot z istnieniem 1907–1963), 
[Philosophical problems with solitude (H. Elzenberg, The trouble with being 1907-1963)] 
in P. Domeracki , W. Tyburski  (eds.), Zrozumieć samotność. Studium interdyscyplinarne, [Understanding 
solitude. An interdisciplinary study.] UMK Press, Toruń 2006, p. 115–127. 
48
 This is an expression of my own design, based on the Greek words: ‘monosé’ – ‘solitude’ and ‘logos’ – 
‘science’, and denoting the study of solitude. This term can be used in its strong and weak version. In the latter, 
as simply meaning philosophy of solitude; in its strong version it denotes the general study of solitude in an 
interdisciplinary framework, consisting of such domains and perspectives as: philosophy of solitude, psychology 
of solitude, sociology of solitude, pedagogy of solitude, anthropology of solitude, theology of solitude and 




the rarest of circumstances does it happen to meet a man for whom human progress is a matter of 
concern. And it is thus: in every minute of our lives we can find a hundred allies in our common, 
mediocre enterprises; a hundred people ready to justify our every failure: but to find allies in our superior 
spiritual goals is difficult
49
 (emphasis. P.D.).  
 
In its essence every concept that develops the notion of the aristocratism of the spirit is 
founded on the interplay between the ideas of individuality, seclusion, alienation, outsiderism, 
asceticism, silence, contemplation, internal dialogue, self-exploration, being true to oneself, 
wisdom, striving for moral perfection, and freedom. Elzenberg’s aristocratism undoubtedly 
contains the notions mentioned above. To describe these notions and concepts in detail would 
shed light on Elzenberg’s approach toward aristocratism as a whole. I will not, however, 





It appears that in order to summarize the issues discussed in the present paper, taking full 
responsibility for their brief, perfunctory nature, it is necessary to present Elzenberg’s opinion 
on the validity of the notion of the aristocratism of the spirit and the possibility of introducing 
this idea into public debate. Despite what one might have thought, in reality Elzenberg’s 
position in the overall balance is rather weak. Naturally, this does not indicate the 
philosopher’s dejection toward the implementation of the notion of the aristocratism of the 
spirit, but is rather an illustration of his healthy distance and lack of naïveté, something that 
was not common in the advocates of ethical intellectualism, who maintained that virtue can be 
taught to anybody. Elzenberg’s approach views ethical perfectionism as a domain of chosen 
individuals, rather than a material to be spread among the masses. As for the possibility of 
introducing the aristocratic ideal into contemporary society, into the Polish nation, Elzenberg 
is in no doubt with regard to the fact that this is pure fiction. 
 
From the moment of the significant breakthrough, that is the war and, importantly, the revolution, many 
of my ideas have been rendered obsolete, they have acquired properties so ‘academic’ and hopelessly 
remote from reality that I cannot dream to be able to influence this life through them. Among these I 
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would classify my certain philosophy of nationalism, aristocratism …
50
. …The aristocratic ideal (the 
beautiful one) could be implemented perhaps on Aldebaran. Now is, the time of democracy, and will 
continue to be. And even if some aristocracy was to eventually emerge from these years of chaos and 
fighting it will be aristocracy of such louts, that prime minister Barcioch and minister Fafała would be 
head and shoulders above it
51
. (emphasis P.D.) 
 
What is it, then, that remains? Elzenberg’s answer is straightforward and rather striking - ...I 
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